Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction: Evidence From Small Business Debt by Cassar, Gavin et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
4-2015
Alternative Information Sources and Information
Asymmetry Reduction: Evidence From Small
Business Debt
Gavin Cassar
Christopher D. Ittner
University of Pennsylvania
Ken S. Cavalluzzo
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/17
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cassar, G., Ittner, C. D., & Cavalluzzo, K. S. (2015). Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction:
Evidence From Small Business Debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 59 (2-3), 242-263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jacceco.2014.08.003
Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction:
Evidence From Small Business Debt
Abstract
We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual accounting) interact
with other information sources to reduce information asymmetries between small business borrowers and
lenders, thereby lowering borrowers׳ probability of loan denial and cost of debt. We find that higher third
party credit scores, but not the use of accrual accounting, decrease the likelihood of loan denial. However,
firms using accrual accounting exhibit statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many factors
associated with the cost of debt. Further, the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are greatest when
the borrower׳s credit score is low and/or the length of its banking relationship with the lender is short. This
evidence indicates that accrual accounting can benefit small business borrowers, but that the information
contained in third-party credit scores and obtained through ongoing banking relationships can substitute for
the incremental information provided by accrual accounting.
Keywords
accounting sophistication, accrual accounting, credit scores, cost of capital, relationship lending
Disciplines
Accounting | Economics
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/17
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125146
Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction:  
Evidence from Small Business Debt 
 
Gavin Cassar 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Christopher D. Ittner 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Ken S. Cavalluzzo 
Wisconsin Capital Management 
Madison WI 
 
November 2010 
 
ABSTRACT: We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual 
accounting) interacts with other information sources and the pledging of collateral to reduce information 
asymmetries between small business borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers’ probability of 
loan denial and cost of debt.  We find that higher third party credit scores, but not the use of accrual 
accounting, decrease the likelihood of loan denial.  However, firms using accrual accounting exhibit 
statistically lower interest rates after controlling for many factors associated with the cost of debt.  
Further, third-party credit scores and information obtained through ongoing banking relationships appear 
to substitute for the incremental information from accrual accounting, with the benefits from accruals 
decreasing in the firm’s credit score and relationship length.  We find little evidence that any of the 
alternative information sources influence loan decisions when collateral is pledged, consistent with 
theories that collateral provides an alternative means for addressing information asymmetry problems.  
Finally, our results indicate that borrower characteristics such as the firm's age and legal liability further 
moderate the relations between the various information sources and interest rates. 
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Alternative Information Sources and Information Asymmetry Reduction: 
Evidence from Small Business Debt 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial body of accounting research examines the influence of “higher quality” or 
“more sophisticated” accounting information on a firm's cost of debt capital (see Armstrong et al., 
2010 for a review).  In theory, borrowers can reduce information asymmetries with lenders by 
providing higher quality accounting information prepared using more sophisticated methods, thereby 
increasing access to debt financing and lowering interest rates.  Although existing studies provide 
some support for this proposition, they typically ignore the role played by alternative information 
sources that may alter or reduce the ability of more sophisticated accounting methods to convey 
useful and relevant information, leading Beyer et al. (2010, p. 116) to conclude “that one of the 
biggest challenges and opportunities facing researchers is considering the interactions among the 
various information sources.” 
We begin to address this challenge by examining the influence of alternative information 
sources and their interactions on small business lending decisions.  Lenders are the primary external 
users of financial reports from small, privately-held firms (Nair and Rittenberg, 1983).  When 
submitting loan applications, potential borrowers must provide some form of financial information, 
which can vary in sophistication from simple bank statements and tax returns to more sophisticated 
accounting statements prepared using generally-accepted accounting principles.  However, 
accounting reports are not the only source of "hard" information lenders can use to assess loan 
applications.1
                                                          
1 Petersen (2004) defines hard information as being “quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, 
and its content is independent of the collection process.” In contrast, soft information is “not easily or accurately reducible 
to a numerical score, and cannot be communicate this information to the broader lending markets and thus negotiate a 
lower loan rate from its bank” (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
  Small business credit scores prepared by third parties offer another method for 
obtaining hard, quantified information on borrowers (Petersen, 2004), potentially reducing any 
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informational advantages from more such accounting reports.  Credit scoring agencies gather data on 
credit payment history, business demographics, other public information such as liens, judgments, 
and bankruptcy proceeding, and (in some cases) financial information to assess the probability that 
borrowers will meet their loan obligations, giving lenders an alternative method for evaluating loan 
applications and monitoring borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger and Frame, 2007).  Even 
more important may be the “softer,” more subtle information obtained through a lender's existing 
relationship with a borrower.  Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that relationship banking 
information may be a better source of information about small business credit worthiness than “hard,” 
quantitative information such as accounting reports or credit scores (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 1989; 
Sharpe, 1990; Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cowen and Cowen, 2006), potentially 
subsuming any incremental information provided by more sophisticated accounting reports.  Yet, 
despite the availability of these various hard and soft information sources, evidence on the extent to 
which the alternative sources act as complements or substitutes in reducing information asymmetries 
in small (or large) business lending decisions is limited. 
We investigate the interactive effects of accounting information, credit scores, and 
relationship banking on the availability and cost of debt using a sample of small, privately-held U.S. 
companies with fewer than 500 employees, gathered in the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) 
conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve.  Our proxy for accounting sophistication is the use of accrual 
accounting, one of the most fundamental properties of generally-accepted accounting principles.  
Unlike larger firms, the small businesses in our sample have no tax or external reporting requirements 
to use accrual accounting, making its use a voluntary choice.  More sophisticated accrual accounting 
methods are argued to provide incremental information above cash-based accounts, thereby offering a 
better indicator of company performance and financial standing, and reducing information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.  These claims suggest that lenders will be more likely to 
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provide loans and offer lower interest rates to firms using accrual accounting.  However, if third party 
credit scores and/or relationship banking provide complementary or substitute means for reducing 
information asymmetries, any potential benefits from accrual accounting may be moderated by the 
information provided by these alternative sources. 
In addition to using alternative information sources to address information asymmetry 
problems, lenders can adjust contractual characteristics (Armstrong et al., 2010).  In the small 
business setting, the primary debt contract characteristic used to address information asymmetries is 
the provision of collateral by borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2006).  Economic theories argue that 
collateral can serve as an alternative to higher quality information for reducing information 
asymmetry problems between small business borrowers and lenders (Coco, 2000).  These claims 
suggest that any loan advantages from higher quality accounting (or other) information will be 
minimized when the borrower has pledged collateral. 
We find little evidence that accrual accounting reduces the likelihood of loan denial after 
controlling for other factors previously found to be associated with small business loan decisions.  
These (and our other) results are robust to controlling for self-selection in the decision to apply for a 
loan and endogeneity in the choice to use accrual accounting.  However, higher credit scores are 
negatively associated with loan denial, suggesting that the broad third-party information contained in 
these scores is used in the initial decision to accept or deny the application, while the incremental 
information from accrual accounting has little influence on this decision.  This evidence is consistent 
with experimental and qualitative studies finding that the initial approval decision is based on simple, 
aggregate financial information and other general background data (such as that contained in credit 
scores) rather than on the analysis of detailed accounting information (Danos et al., 1989; Berry et al., 
1993), as well as with banks' increasing use of automated loan approval models based on credit 
scores (Petersen, 2004). 
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In contrast, accrual accounting is negatively associated with the initial interest rate on 
approved loans, consistent with this more sophisticated accounting method reducing information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.  However, the interest rate benefits from accrual 
accounting decrease when the borrower's credit score is higher and/or the length of its banking 
relationship with the lender is longer.  That is, firms with lower (higher) credit scores and/or shorter 
(longer) banking relationships receive greater (smaller) interest rate benefits from accrual accounting.  
Further analysis indicates that accrual accounting only has a significant influence on interest rates in 
firms with extremely low credit scores and very short banking relationships.  Similar substitution 
effects are found for credit scores and relationship lengths.  For example, any interest rate benefits 
from higher credit scores appear to be limited to businesses without longstanding relationships with 
their lenders, and vice versa.  
This evidence supports claims that the information obtained in extended banking relationships 
supersedes other sources of information for small business lending decisions.  Similarly, firms with 
easily obtainable third-party credit scores that are sufficiently high receive little benefit from more 
sophisticated accrual accounting methods.  Supplemental tests provide no evidence that the 
preparation of financial statements (defined as an income statement and a balance sheet) or the 
provision of audited financial statements influence lending decisions in our sample, regardless of the 
use or nonuse of accrual accounting, credit scores, or relationship length.  Further analysis indicates 
that any benefits from these alternative information sources is minimized by the pledging of 
collateral, consistent with theories that debt contract characteristics can substitute for more 
informative hard and soft information.  Finally, we find that other firm characteristics such as the 
firm's age and legal liability also moderate the relations between the various information sources and 
interest rates.  Overall, our results suggest that requiring small, private businesses to prepare financial 
statements using more sophisticated accounting methods is likely to benefit only a subset of 
 5 
borrowers and lenders.  More importantly, our tests point out the importance of considering the 
interactions between various information sources and contractual characteristics when assessing the 
benefits from different accounting practices. 
This study makes three related contributions to the accounting literature. First, we extend the 
limited but growing body of research on small, privately-held businesses, a major sector of the 
economy.2
                                                          
2 See Botosan et al. (2006) and IFA (2006) for reviews of studies on financial accounting practices in small 
businesses. 
  Accounting standard-setters are placing increasing emphasis on accounting methods in 
these firms. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (AICPA/FASB, 2006), for example, have established a joint committee to 
investigate accounting standards in private businesses, most of which are small. Similarly, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 2007) has proposed new accounting standards for 
small- and medium-sized entities.  In addressing these issues, both the AICPA/FASB committee and 
IASB state that they will consider the benefits to external accounting statement users.  Recent 
accounting studies suggest that more sophisticated audited or accruals-based financial statements can 
lower the cost of small, private business debt, but do not examine firms using cash accounting (Kim 
et al., 2007; Minnis, 2010) or firms using accrual accounting but not having financial statements 
(Allee and Yohn, 2009).  None of these studies investigates the influence of alternative information 
sources, the focus of this study.  Similarly, a number of banking studies have examined the impact of 
banking relationships (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen, 2004) or 
credit scores (e.g., Frame et al., 2001; Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007) on small business 
lending, but have ignored the role of accounting information.  By examining the joint influence of 
these alternative information sources on small business lending decisions, we provide evidence on the 
informational settings in which more sophisticated accounting methods (in our case the use of 
accruals) are likely to provide the greatest benefit to small business borrowers and lenders. 
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Second, we extend research on the broader question of the relative informativeness of more 
sophisticated or “higher quality” accounting by investigating a setting where accounting 
sophistication varies substantially and information asymmetries are relatively large.  Like large, 
public companies, the information environment in small businesses includes accounting information, 
voluntary disclosures of other “hard” and “soft” information, and information produced by third-party 
intermediaries.  However, the small firm setting has the advantage of having fewer competing 
information sources and no mandatory accounting practices that may affect observed associations 
between accounting sophistication and lending decisions.  In addition, because accrual accounting is 
a voluntary choice in our sample, we can examine the benefits from more sophisticated accrual 
accounting using a direct measure of the underlying accounting technology employed by the firm 
rather than an earnings-based “accruals quality” proxy that is prone to measurement error (Beyer et 
al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010).  As a result, our small business sample offers cleaner tests of the 
influence of and interactions between alternative information sources on the cost of debt than is 
possible using data from large, public companies. 
Third, we respond to calls in the accounting and banking literatures to examine the 
interactions between alternative information choices and debt contract characteristics (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009).  Our evidence indicates that lenders 
attempt to reduce information asymmetry problems either through the information provided by 
alternative information sources or through collateral requirements.  These results indicate that future 
studies must consider broader information and contractual environments when assessing the 
implications of accounting practices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews related 
literature and develops our research questions.  Section 3 outlines our research design.  Empirical 
results are presented in section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1. Information Asymmetries and Small Business Lending Decisions 
Lenders base loan approval and pricing decisions on the assessed probability of applicants’ 
ability to repay loans.  However, information asymmetries between firm managers and lenders 
generally result in insiders having better information on the firm’s past and future economic 
performance and, consequently, on firm default risk (Sengupta, 1998; Bharath et al., 2008).  
Information asymmetries tend to be greater in small, private businesses, which often have little 
institutional history and are not required to publicly disclose company-specific information (Butler et 
al., 2007).  As a result, these businesses tend to be more informationally opaque than larger, publicly-
listed firms, increasing information risk and potentially influencing lending decisions. 
Berger and Udall (2006) argue that financial institutions use four primary methods to 
compensate for information asymmetries in small business lending decisions: (1) accounting-based 
lending; (2) credit scoring; (3) relationship lending; and (4) collateral-based lending.3
2.2. Accounting-Based Lending 
  The following 
sections discuss these methods and their potential interactions in small business lending decisions.   
One way for small businesses to reduce information asymmetries is providing more 
informative financial reports.  Lenders require small businesses to submit at least some financial 
information, such as tax returns or financial statements, with their loan applications.  This 
information can be prepared using cash or accrual accounting.4
Much of the accounting literature assumes that accrual accounting is more informative than 
cash accounting, and surveys find that small business lenders rate accrual accounting their preferred 
   
                                                          
3 Two additional small business lending methods identified by Berger and Udell (2006) are factoring of accounts 
receivable and leasing.  These methods are not included in our study. 
4 As discussed in more detail later, small, private businesses in the U.S. are not required to use accrual 
accounting for securities regulation purposes, and generally do not need to use accrual accounting for tax purposes unless 
their sales exceed $5 million.  In other countries, small, private firms may be legally required to use accrual accounting 
for financial reporting or tax purposes (IFA, 2006). 
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source of financial information for decision-making (Baker and Cunningham, 1993; AICPA, 2004).  
Since economic transactions are often separate and distinct from their associated cash flows, accrual 
accounting allows firms to overcome timing and matching problems that make cash accounting a 
noisy measure of performance (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992; Dechow, 1994).  Through the use of accruals, 
non-cash economic transactions can be reflected in financial reports in a more timely manner that 
better matches revenues and costs, thereby providing a better indication of enterprise performance 
(FASB, 1978).  The use of accrual accounting may also provide a positive signal of firm management 
since this method is typically assumed to reflect greater management sophistication and higher 
accounting quality, and management may use accruals to signal private information (e.g., Louis and 
Robinson, 2005).  If these potential benefits reduce information asymmetries between applicants and 
lenders and signal greater credit worthiness, loan denials and interest rates should be lower in small 
businesses using accrual accounting.  
In contrast, some argue that cash accounting provides more informative information on small 
business applicants’ ability to meet their loan obligations, which is the primary financial question 
facing lenders.  For information beyond cash flows to be incorporated into accounting reports, 
management requires discretion to determine accruals levels.  While discretion can be used by 
management to reflect private information and non-cash economic transactions, management can also 
use this discretion to distort the reported financial performance and position of the firm for self-
interested purposes.  Consistent with lenders recognizing the possibility that borrowers may 
manipulate accruals to improve reported financial standing, survey evidence from loan officers and 
financial analysts suggests that the objective nature of cash relative to accruals is an important benefit 
for lending decisions (Jones, 1998; Jones and Widjaja, 1998).  If the net effect of managerial 
discretion in determining accruals is providing less informative accounting information, then accrual 
accounting should not be associated with greater loan acceptance or lower interest rates.  
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Accounting reports based on cash flows may also provide sufficient information to evaluate 
solvency and the probability of default, without any of the incremental information provided by 
accruals.  Jones et al. (1995) and Lee (1993) summarize a number of arguments for why cash 
accounting may be at least as beneficial as accrual accounting for lending decisions.  In addition to 
the arbitrary nature of accruals, these arguments include cash accounting being more predictive of 
future cash flows and financial distress in many businesses; providing a relatively unambiguous 
measure of managerial performance; and emphasizing the primary importance of cash resources for 
ongoing liquidity and solvency.  An AICPA (2004) survey supports the notion that cash accounting 
may be sufficient for many small business lending decisions, finding that 57.7 percent of lenders do 
not require accrual accounting from private borrowers. 
Although considerable debate exists over the relative benefits of cash and accrual accounting 
for small business lending decisions, empirical evidence is limited.  Francis et al. (2005) and Bharath 
et al. (2008) examine the implications of accruals “quality” for debt contracting in large, public 
companies.  They find lower costs of debt when accruals quality is higher.  However, since their 
sample firms are required to use accrual accounting, these analyses shed no light on the relative 
benefits of cash and accrual accounting.5
Experimental studies have examined the relative importance of these two accounting methods 
for lending decisions, with mixed results.  Riahi-Belakaoui (1992) finds that loan officers examining 
cash- or accrual-based financial statements from the same company show a clear preference for 
accrual accounting when determining the firm’s ability to repay its loans, loan acceptance, and 
interest rate.  Sharma and Iselin’s (2003) experiment, on the other hand, indicates that bankers’ 
 
                                                          
5 Other evidence from listed firms, which are required to use accrual accounting, suggests that analysts find cash 
flows more important in assessing firm value among highly levered firms, and that analysts are more likely to disseminate 
cash flow forecasts when the firm is in poor financial health (DeFond and Hung 2003; Previts et al., 1994), both of which 
may be true of many small businesses.  In addition, Hanlon et al. (2006) find that changes in tax laws that required large 
firms to use accrual accounting for tax purposes caused the informativeness of the accrual-based external financial 
statements to decline in firms that previously used cash accounting for tax purposes.   
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judgments regarding solvency are more accurate using cash flow information than using accrual 
accounting.  Jones’ (1998) experiment concludes that cash flow statements, compared to accrual-
based financial statements, have comparable or greater decision-making influence across a broad 
variety of lending decisions. 
In a related study using the 2003 SSBF data, Allee and Yohn (2009) examine the 
determinants and lending consequences of financial statement preparation in small businesses.  As 
part of this analysis, Allee and Yohn incorporate a single indicator variable measuring whether firms 
that report using financial statements (defined as the use of a balance sheet and income statement) to 
answer the SSBF survey questions and using accrual accounting have lower probability of loan 
denial and lower interest rates.  They find mixed support for these predictions.  However, their 
sample includes firms with sales greater than $5 million (which generally are required to use accrual 
accounting for tax purposes and therefore did not make the voluntary choice to use accruals) and 
excludes firms that use accrual accounting but did not use financial statements when responding to 
the survey.  In fact, 26.1 percent of the firms in our loan application sample report using accrual 
accounting but not using financial statements when responding to the survey, and only 10.2 percent 
report using accruals and financial statements.  Thus, Allee and Yohn’s study provides only a partial 
analysis of the influence of accrual accounting on small business lending decisions.  
2.3. Credit Scores And Lending Decisions 
Accounting reports are not the only source of information lenders can use to evaluate the 
financial condition and riskiness of potential borrowers.  Credit scores are now readily available for 
many small businesses.  These scores, which can be purchased from credit rating agencies such as 
Dun & Bradstreet and Experian, incorporate a broad set of information on past credit history, 
business demographics, other public information on financial history, and (in some cases) firm 
accounting information (typically provided by the small business itself and not required to be 
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prepared using accrual accounting).  For example, Dun & Bradstreet credit scores (which are the 
most widely-used small business credit scores and the scores used in our analyses) are primarily 
based on the owners’ and firm’s credit payment history, along with information from public filings 
(e.g., bankruptcy proceedings, judgments, and suits), and (when provided by the firm) financial 
information on sales, net worth, and working capital (Kallberg and Udell, 2003).  Firms are not 
required to submit financial data to Dun & Bradstreet, and when they do it typically includes only 
balance sheet information.  For competitive reasons, very few firms submit income statement data to 
credit rating agencies, so this information generally is not incorporated into their credit scores.  
Kallberg and Udell (2003) find that information in Dun & Bradstreet credit scores (particularly credit 
payment history) exhibits significant incremental ability to predict small business failure, over and 
above accounting information.  
The economics literature on small business lending suggests that the “hard,” quantitative 
information in credit scores provides a cost effective method for lenders to evaluate loan applications 
and monitor borrowers (e.g., Frame et al., 2001; Akhavein et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2005; Berger 
and Frame, 2007).  Broader availability of third-party credit scores and reduced cost of information 
transfer have led an increasing number of banks to utilize these scores in loan approval and risk-
based pricing models (Cowen and Cowen, 2006; Petersen, 2004), either using the scores by 
themselves or in conjunction with other information.6
                                                          
6 Lenders can develop their own credit scores instead of using scores from third-party vendors.  However, 78.6 
percent of banks surveyed by Cowen and Cowen (2006) use small business credit scores purchased from third-parties. 
  Cowen and Cowen’s (2006) survey of banks’ 
use of credit scores supports the claimed advantages from this information source, with the highest 
ranked reason for adopting credit scoring being quantifying credit evaluation, followed by 
simplifying loan applications and inexpensive access to additional information.  On the other hand, 
neither credit scores nor accruals may have a significant effect on lending decisions.  Banks rank cash 
flow information the most important factor in small business loan approval decisions, far above credit 
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scores (Cowen and Cowen, 2006), suggesting that cash accounting information may be sufficient for 
lending decisions.   
2.4. Relationship Lending 
The discussion thus far has focused on the influence of “hard” information on lending 
decisions.  While the hard information in accounting reports and credit scores may be important 
factors in small business lending decisions, even more important may be the “soft” information 
obtained through ongoing banking relationships (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Petersen, 2004).  This information, such as a loan officer’s knowledge of the potential borrower’s 
ability, character, and trustworthiness, is “soft” in the sense that it is hard to quantify and 
communicate to others, and may not be verifiable by outsiders.  If the accuracy of information 
regarding a potential borrower increases the longer the relationship between the parties exists, and 
thereby reduces information asymmetries, past dealings with a borrower may provide superior 
information for assessing credit worthiness (Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
Despite the potential informational advantages from ongoing banking relationships, their 
theoretical influence on lending decisions is unclear.  Boot and Thakor (1994) show that interest rates 
decline as the savings from the bank’s improved knowledge of the borrower is passed on to the 
borrower.  In contrast, Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) predict that interest rates increase 
with relationship length as the bank’s improved knowledge may “lock in” the borrower in the 
relationship.  The conflicting theoretical predictions are mirrored in the mixed empirical evidence on 
the impact of relationship duration on interest rates (e.g., Ongena and Smith, 2001; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Bharath et al., 2009).  Thus, the influence of 
banking relationships on loan decisions remains unclear, particularly in the presence of other 
information sources.  
2.5. Interactions Among Alternative Information Sources 
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While each of the above information sources is part of the firm’s “information environment,” 
little empirical research has been devoted to the interdependencies and complementarities between 
accounting and other information sources (Beyer et al., 2010).  For example, whether firm-produced 
accounting information, third-party credit scores, and soft information from on-going banking 
relationships are complementary or substitute information sources is unclear.  Berger and Udell 
(2006) argue that banks can use combinations of these information sources to minimize information 
asymmetry problems.  Similarly, Cowen and Cowen (2006) suggest that banks can supplement third-
party credit scores with additional information such as financial reports based on accrual accounting, 
with the combined information sources acting as complements and further reducing information 
asymmetries.  Other studies, however, suggest that these alternative information sources are 
substitutes.  Bharath et al. (2009), for example, find that the benefits from relationship lending are 
nullified if the firm has publicly-rated debt.  Brown and Zehnder’s (2007) experiment shows credit 
scores have little effect on lending decisions in settings with repeated interactions between borrowers 
and lenders.  Cowen and Cowen’s (2006) survey finds that respondents rank banking relationships as 
the dominant factor in small business lending decisions, despite the availability of accounting 
information and credit scores   
The mixed empirical results for the three individual information sources, together with the 
availability of alternative information sources, has led to calls for researchers to examine the 
interactions among these sources when assessing their impact on lending decisions (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Byers et al., 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009).  These calls lead to our first research 
question:   
To what extent do accrual accounting, credit scores, and relationship banking interact to 
influence small business lending decisions?  
 
2.6. The Moderating Effects of Collateral  
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Rather than relying on information gathering to mitigate information asymmetries with 
potential borrowers, lenders can modify loan contract features.  In the small business lending context, 
this frequently takes the form of collateral pledging (Berger and Udell, 2006; Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009).  Economic theories contend that collateral can reduce information asymmetry 
problems through two means (see Coco, 2000, for a review).  First, pledging collateral can reduce 
adverse selection problems by serving as a screening mechanism, with higher quality borrowers more 
willing to put their assets at stake.  Second, collateral can play an incentive role by increasing the 
borrower’s effort and minimizing the probability that the borrower will shift from low-risk to higher-
risk projects, thereby reducing moral hazard problems.  However, despite these potential benefits, 
empirical evidence on the value of collateral as an information asymmetry reducing tool is 
inconsistent.  Steijvers and Voordeckers’ (2009) review concludes that a plausible explanation for the 
mixed results, and a major limitation of this literature, is examining the use of collateral in isolation 
of other information asymmetry reducing mechanism such as hard and soft information sources.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by Bharath et al.’s (2008) finding that the use of collateral is more frequent 
when accruals “quality” is lower.  The potential tradeoffs between the alternative information sources 
and loan contract features leads to our second research question: 
To what extent does the pledging of collateral substitute for higher quality information 
sources in small business lending decisions? 
 
These open empirical questions are of significant importance since firms have the discretion 
to invest in greater accounting sophistication and, with sufficient time, to transact with lenders to 
reduce information asymmetries, potentially leading to greater access to capital and lower cost of 
debt.  However, if these benefits are only obtained under certain conditions, such as settings where 
alternative information sources or contractual features do not adequately minimize information 
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asymmetry problems, then mandatory or across-the-board promotion of greater accounting 
sophistication to improve small business access to capital may not be appropriate. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3. Sample 
We examine the implications of interactions between accrual accounting and alternative 
information sources on small business debt using data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business 
Finance (SSBF) administrated by the U.S. Federal Reserve and Small Business Administration.  The 
2003 SSBF is a nationally representative sample of 4,240 non-farm, non-subsidiary business 
enterprises with fewer than 500 employees.  A stratified random sampling procedure based on 
employment size, urban/rural status, and census divisions (as reported in Dun’s Market Identifier file) 
was employed.  The survey used a two-stage collection process.  First, an initial interview assessed 
firm eligibility for the SSBF using the preceding criteria.  Second, a main telephone interview of 
eligible establishments was conducted, with an average duration of 59 minutes.  The overall response 
rate was 32 percent (FRB, 2006). 
We remove publicly-held entities (n = 5) and those with missing or non-positive assets, sales, 
or shareholders (n = 508).  We also remove 351 corporations that were not S-corporations or were 
partnerships with annual gross receipts above $5 million since these entities are prohibited from using 
cash accounting for tax purposes (IRS, 1999).7
                                                          
7 Later versions of IRS Publication 538 were released in March 2004, January 2007, and March 2008, but the 
1999 version was the most current at the time of the 2003 SSBF. Additional regulatory triggers related to inventory, 
corporate form, and operations may also require accrual accounting. However, several regulatory exemptions override 
these triggers. Rev. Proc. 2001-10 and Rev. Proc. 2002-28 provide detailed exemptions for entities with gross annual 
receipts under $1 million and $10 million, respectively. In unreported results, we repeated the analyses using firms with 
gross annual receipts under $1 million or under $10 million. The findings are consistent with those reported. However, 
the interest rate findings for accrual accounting are slightly stronger in magnitude when gross receipts are under $1 
million. In addition to tax requirements, the Securities and Exchange Commission mandates the use of accrual accounting 
for: 1) all listed firms; 2) firms that previously offered shares under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with greater than 
300 shareholders in the class of offered securities; or 3) firms with $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders. Our 
sample does not meet any of these conditions.  
  We eliminate these observations to focus on firms 
that have no regulatory requirement to use accrual accounting for any purpose.  As a result, the 
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sample reflects firms that voluntarily chose to use cash or accrual accounting.  We also remove 83 
entities that did not have a credit score or did not respond to the accrual accounting question. 
We further restrict the sample to firms that recently applied for a loan, provided the outcome 
of the application, and provided responses to survey questions on the factors predicted to be 
associated with loan denial.  These criteria reduce the sample to 1,385.  Finally, in tests examining 
interest rate determinants, we restrict the sample to the subset of firms with recent debt financing that 
provided the interest rate on their most recent loan and had no missing responses to the questions 
used for our independent variables.  These criteria reduce the number of firms in our interest rate 
analyses to 1,191.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process for the study, and Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in our analyses.  The mean 
(median) firm has assets of $1,581,371 ($144,544), with 92 percent managed by an owner of the firm 
and 85 percent family owned. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Availability and Cost of Debt. Respondents applying for at least one loan in the 
previous three years were asked whether their loan applications were approved.  Consistent with 
previous research, we assess the availability of debt using the variable Loan denial, which equals one 
if the entity was denied credit on any loan requests during this period, and zero otherwise.  Eleven 
percent of the firms that applied for loans were denied in the previous three years.  We measure the 
cost of debt using the variable Interest rate, which is the original interest rate on the most recently 
approved loan or line of credit.8  The mean (median) initial interest rate is 5.97 percent (5.90 percent) 
on a mean (median) loan amount of $862,542 ($100,000).9
                                                          
8 The direct measurement of loan interest rates rather than the use of an estimated average cost of debt measure 
inferred from the income statement and balance sheet avoids measurement concerns such as identifying liabilities that are 
contracted at arm’s length and staleness caused by loan maturities greater than one year.  These concerns are exacerbated 
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3.2.2. Accrual Accounting Use. Our accrual accounting indicator is obtained from the 
question: “Did the business use cash or accrual accounting to prepare its financial records for the 
fiscal year ending [DATE]?”  The survey defined cash and accrual accounting as follows: 
The distinction between the cash basis of accounting and the accrual basis of 
accounting lies in the time at which revenues and expenses are recognized. Under 
cash basis accounting, revenue is recorded when payment is collected from the 
customer, rather than when a sale is actually made. Under accrual basis accounting, 
however, revenue is recorded at the time of the sale even if cash has not yet been 
collected. 
Similarly, expenses are recorded under cash basis when payment is made, rather than 
when related goods or services are used. Expenses are recognized when the related 
goods or services are used, rather than when payment is made, under the accrual basis 
of accounting. 
For example, for a business with a fiscal year ending December 31st, interest incurred 
for the month of December will be recorded as an expense under the accrual basis of 
accounting, even if payment is not made until the following year. Under the cash 
basis, however, interest incurred but not paid is not recognized as an expense. 
 
If respondents were uncertain about their use of cash or accrual accounting, they were referred 
to the relevant box in their tax returns requiring them to indicate whether they used cash or accrual 
accounting when completing their tax forms.  Thirty-six percent of our sample reported using accrual 
accounting.  The variable Accrual equals one if the firm used accrual accounting, and zero otherwise.  
Importantly, this measure of accounting sophistication is not based on the empirical properties of 
accounting numbers, but on the underlying technology for computing and reporting financial 
information to the firm’s financers, thereby avoiding concerns that it is capturing firm or industry 
characteristics that can cause common earnings-based accruals proxies to erroneously exhibit greater 
accounting “quality” in some situations (Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
when examining smaller, private firms (Cassar, 2010) and can result in significant noise in an inferred cost of debt 
measure. 
9 A minority of studies that have investigated the association between the cost of debt and accounting quality and 
sophistication have specified the cost of debt variable as the difference between the interest rate on the loan and the prime 
rate (e.g., Blackwell, Noland, and Winters, 1998). To examine whether our findings are robust to this specification, we 
adopt this alternative cost of debt variable and remove prime rate as a control variable from our interest rate model. In 
unreported results, all findings are consistent using this alternative cost of debt measure. 
 18 
3.2.3. Credit Scores. The Federal Reserve Board purchased credit scores for the respondents’ 
businesses from Dun & Bradstreet.  Like most third-party credit scoring methods, the Dun & 
Bradstreet small business commercial credit scores are based on information regarding the firm’s 
historical and current payment behavior, other publicly-available data that may influence loan 
payment delinquency (e.g., liens or open lawsuits), business demographics, and (when provided by 
the potential borrower) financial strength and performance.  The scores range from 0 (highest risk) to 
100 (lowest risk).  In our sample, the mean (median) Credit score is 58.97 (63.00). 
3.2.4. Relationship Banking. We assess the influence of relationship banking on interest rates 
using the variable Relationship, which equals the log of the number of years the firm had conducted 
business with the lending institution at the time of the most recently approved loan application plus 
one.10
3.2.5. Control Variables. Several variables are used to control for other potential determinants 
of loan denial and interest rates.
  Following prior studies (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994), we assume that information 
asymmetries are lower when the firm has conducted business with the lending institution for a longer 
period of time.  The number of years the firm has conducted business with the lending institution 
ranges from 0 to 79 years (mean = 8.85; median = 5.50). 
11
                                                          
10 The survey does not provide information on the length of banking relationships for denied loans.  As a result, 
we are unable to examine the effect of relationship length on the availability of debt.  
  These variables are drawn from earlier research on small business 
lending (e.g., Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 2002; Allee and Yohn, 2009).  
Control variables from the SSBF include firm leverage, size, use of collateral, and loan characteristics 
such as loan type (e.g., line of credit, capital lease, vehicle loan), amount, and whether the loan’s 
11 Several of the independent control variables used in our tests are financial ratios based on accounting values. 
The use of these ratios is consistent with previous SSBF-based research. However, the accounting values may be a 
function of the firm’s accounting methods, potentially altering the financial ratios in a systematic manner (Guenther, 
Maydew, and Nutter, 1997). To address this potential limitation, we replaced all measures based on total assets (such as 
the log of total assets and cash-to-assets) with measures based on the number of employees. Further, we removed 
financial ratios that rely on accounting profits. All of the study’s inferences remain after reducing reliance on accounting 
values for our independent variables. 
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interest rate is fixed or floating.  These data are supplemented with information from Federal Reserve 
Reports, namely: 1) Prime rate, which equals the prime rate at the start of the loan; 2) Duration 
spread, defined as the difference between a Baa bond and yield on 10-year treasury bonds at the time 
of the loan; and 3) Term premium, which equals the difference between the yield on a government 
bond with similar maturity and the yield on a treasury bill at the start of the loan.  If the loan does not 
have a fixed maturity, the term premium equals zero.12
3.3. Correlations 
 
Table 3 provides correlations between variables measuring the expected determinants of loan 
denial in Panel A and interest rates in Panel B.  Most or all of the control variables are significantly 
correlated with the two loan variables, and their signs are consistent with previous research. Accrual 
has a small but significant correlation (p < 0.05) with Credit score, and a significant, negative 
correlation with loan denial and interest rates (p < 0.01). Relationship is negatively correlated with 
interest rates (p < 0.01) and positively correlated with Credit score (p < 0.01), but is not significantly 
associated with Accrual. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Econometric Issues 
                                                          
12 The selection of control variables was based on their observed effect on loan denial and interest rate reported 
by research using previous SSBF survey data. We also estimated our models using a large number of other control 
variables. In the loan denial models, these included the log of employment, owners’ education, owners’ years of 
experience, whether the firm was owner-managed, indicators for the owners’ gender and race, sales scope, distance 
between borrower and lender, banking concentration, and corporate form. We estimated the interest rate models after 
including additional variables for region, year, log of employment, rural location, education, years experience, whether 
the firm is owner-managed, log of firm age, sales scope, whether the firm has a checking (savings) account with the 
lender, type of financial institution, if the firm was previously denied a loan, length of relationship and distance from 
lender, whether a guarantee was used, type of collateral, inverse of loan maturity, loan fees, percentage to close loan, sales 
growth, asset turnover, profit margin, return on assets, firm and owner bankruptcy and judgment, banking concentration, 
and corporate form. Since the results vary little using these additional control variables, and their inclusion substantially 
reduces sample sizes in our tests due to missing data, they are not included in the reported models to simplify 
presentation. 
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Two important econometric issues in our study are the endogenous choice of accounting 
sophistication and the self-selection of firms that decide to apply for a loan.  
4.1.1. Endogeneity. The level of accounting sophistication is a choice variable for the firm.  
Endogeneity in this choice is an important issue because many factors that influence this decision are 
also likely to influence lending decisions, potentially leading to correlated omitted variables 
problems.  We therefore supplement our accrual accounting variable with a variable that attempts to 
control for endogeneity issues. 
Addressing endogeneity requires instrumental variables that are correlated with the use of 
accrual accounting but are uncorrelated with errors in the loan denial or interest rate models.  We use 
two variables to instrument accrual accounting use: 1) the presence of accounts receivable (coded one 
if credit is provided to customers and zero otherwise), and 2) industry days in inventory (defined as 
the average days of inventory for companies in the firm’s two-digit SIC code, as reported in 
Compustat for firms with less than $5 million in revenues).  We use an indicator variable for the 
presence of accounts receivable rather than the value of these accounts to minimize concerns that 
larger accounts receivable can serve as collateral or be factored, thereby influencing lending 
decisions.13
                                                          
13 Slightly fewer than two-thirds (63.9 percent) of firms having accounts receivable use accrual accounting. 
Thus, the use accrual accounting and the presence of accounts receivable are not synonymous. 
  Industry (rather than firm-specific) inventory levels are used to minimize concerns that 
individual firms choose inventory levels to influence lending decisions.  As the length of time 
between economic events and their associated cash flows widens, the potential benefits from accrual 
accounting and its revenue recognition and matching principles should increase (Dechow, 1994).  
The presence of accounts receivable and increasing days in inventory should therefore lead to greater 
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need for the firm to address these timing and matching problems, increasing the benefits from (and 
the likelihood of accrual accounting use.14
Table 4 provides results from probit models examining the exogenous determinants of 
Accrual.  The left-most columns display results using the instruments alone, while the right-most 
columns display results with the instruments and the other predicted exogenous variables for the 
denial model (results using interest rate controls not reported to simplify presentation).  In both 
models, the presence of accounts receivable and days in inventory have significant, positive 
associations with accrual use (p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
  
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) argue that only under certain conditions will 2SLS provide 
results superior to OLS.  We evaluate these conditions and the validity of our instruments by 
examining the partial R2s and partial F-statistics of our instruments when included in models with all 
other exogenous variables.  The partial R2 is 0.054 and partial F-statistic is 36.88 (p < 0.0001) for 
loan denial, while the partial R2 is 0.046 and partial F-statistic is 28.49 (p < 0.0001) for interest rate.  
In both models, the instruments’ incremental explanatory power is statistically significant and above 
the recommended magnitudes for adopting our instruments in a 2SLS specification (Stock, Wright, 
and Yogo, 2002).  These results not only support the use of our instrumented accrual accounting 
variable in subsequent tests, but also provide evidence of the convergent validity of our accounting 
choice measure. 
4.1.2. Self-Selection. Another important econometric issue in the loan denial tests is the fact 
that only a subset of firms in the survey applied for debt financing.  Self-selection may affect 
statistical inferences because the choice to apply for financing is truncated (i.e., firms that decided not 
                                                          
14 Another potential instrument for the use of accrual accounting  is the presence of accounts payable.  We do not 
use this as an instrument because it represents trade credit, a potential indicator of credit worthiness. When we include an 
indicator for the presence of accounts payable in the accounting method prediction model, it is positive and significant.  
Results are invariant to using alternative predicted accounting sophistication variables that incorporate accounts payable. 
All findings utilizing instrumental variables are also invariant to using only the presence of accounts receivable or only 
industry days in inventory as instruments. 
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to apply are excluded) and may be correlated with other factors associated with loan acceptance or 
denial, potentially leading to biased parameter estimates.  Heckman (1976) proposes a two-step 
process to account for selection biases.  In the first stage, the self-selection decision is modeled using 
a dichotomous choice method such as logit or probit.  The resulting inverse Mills ratio is then used as 
an additional explanatory variable in the second-stage model to control for selection biases. 
We model the firm’s decision to apply for a loan as a function of several variables expected to 
influence the entity’s demand for debt capital.  These variables include firm age, firm size (measured 
using the log of total assets), ownership characteristics (the presence of an owner-manager and the 
number of owners), cash needs (proxied using the cash-to-assets ratio), profitability (ROA), and 
growth (sales growth over one and three year periods).   
Results from the first-stage probit estimation are presented in Table 5.  Firms applying for 
loans tend to have more assets and owners, to be owner-managed, and to have lower cash-to-asset 
ratios and stronger sales growth over the past year.  We use the first-stage probit estimate to obtain 
the inverse Mills ratio for the loan application decision, and then include this ratio in the second-stage 
loan denial estimates to account for self-selection in loan applications (Amemiya, 1985). 
4.2. Determinants Of Loan Acceptance Or Denial  
Our first tests examine the determinants of loan acceptance or denial.  Table 6 provides results 
from these probit models.15
                                                          
15 The SSBF provides imputed data for most missing values in the original survey, with the imputed data 
provided in the publicly available datasets in five implicates. In our tests, all imputed data are classified as missing. We 
re-estimated the models using actual or imputed data for all observations with non-imputed values for the primary 
dependent variables (accrual accounting, credit score, relationship, loan denial, and interest rate). Results using imputed 
data are consistent with those reported in the tables, suggesting that missing value biases are not driving our results.  Our 
analyses are also performed using unweighted econometric techniques. However, the SSBF is constructed from a 
stratified random sample based on firm size, geographic region, and urbanization. Sample weights are provided to allow 
parameter estimates to be based on the population of firms in the SSBF’s sampling frame. We repeated the analyses using 
weighted least squares based on the sample weights provided in the SSBF. Findings using weighted analyses are 
consistent with the reported findings, with the primary difference being statistically and economically stronger 
associations between information sources and interest rates.  
  Since the dependent variable is an indicator representing whether the 
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firm was denied debt in the past three years, only those firms that applied for loans are included in 
these analyses.  The primary variables of interest in these tests are the “hard” information provided by 
accounting reports and the firm’s credit score.  We also control for factors that previous research 
suggests are determinants of small business loan acceptance or denial, including firm size and age, 
profitability, leverage, and previous credit history.  The inverse Mills ratio is included to control for 
self-selection in the decision to apply for a loan.  
When we estimate the model using the uninstrumented Accrual measure, the coefficient on 
this variable is negative but statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the coefficient on Credit score is 
negative and highly significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed).  These results suggest that higher credit scores 
increase the probability that a small business receives a loan, but that the use of accrual accounting 
has no effect on this decision. 
To examine whether accrual accounting and credit scores are complements or substitutes, we 
add the interaction between these two variables.  For example, the benefits from accrual accounting 
may be greater for firms with lower credit scores, and vice versa.  Alternatively, any benefits from 
accrual accounting may be higher when this method is combined with high credit scores since the 
information provided by one source may be used to validate the information provided by the other.  
Despite these conjectures, the interaction term is not significant, while Credit score remains 
significant and Accrual remains insignificant.  
Results are similar when we replace Accrual with the instrumented use of accrual accounting 
(denoted Accrual_hat) to control for endogeneity in the choice to use this accounting method.  We 
adjust the standard errors in these tests to account for Accrual_hat being an estimate. The coefficients 
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on Credit score continue to be negative and significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed), while the coefficients 
on Accrual_hat and the interaction term are not statistically significant.16
Coefficient signs on the control variables are generally consistent with expectations, with firm 
size and firm age significantly reducing the probability of loan denial, and firm leverage and previous 
delinquencies significantly increasing loan denial probability.  Self-selection in the firms choosing to 
apply for a loan (Inverse Mills ratio) is a significant predictor of loan denial (p < 0.01, two-tailed), 
indicating that the factors that increase the probability a firm applies for a loan also reduce the 
likelihood that the loan will be denied.   
 
In sum, we find no evidence that the use of accrual accounting methods influences the 
probability that a small business’s loan is approved or denied.  Instead, our results suggest that credit 
scores, which provide a relatively low-cost method to quickly assess small business repayment 
probability, are more likely to be used by lenders to make the initial decision to accept or deny a loan 
application.17
4.3. Interest Rates Determinants 
  
We next examine the factors influencing the interest rates on small business loans, given the 
lender’s decision to grant the loan.  These tests are limited to respondents who received a loan in the 
past three years and provided the interest rate on the latest loan.  Results from these tests are provided 
in Table 7.  The models’ R2s range from 0.185 to 0.191, similar to or larger than the magnitudes in 
other small business interest rate studies (e.g., Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 
2002; Allee and Yohn, 2009; Kim et al., 2007).  The signs on the control variables are generally 
                                                          
16 Ai and Norton (2003) note that the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term in a dichotomous model need 
not be the same statistical significance or sign as the marginal effect for each observation. To investigate this concern, we 
investigate these marginal effects. Using model 2, 68.7 percent of the individual marginal effects are positive, with none 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Using model 4, 53.8 percent of the individual marginal effects are positive, with 
only two statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, these results corroborate the insignificant associations between 
the interaction term and loan denial in Table 6. 
17 As noted earlier, the SSBF survey does not provide information on the length of banking relationships when 
loans were denied.  As a result, we are unable to examine the association between relationship length and loan denial.  
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consistent with expectations, with leverage and fixed rate loans positively related to interest rates, and 
loan amount negatively associated with interest rates. 
In contrast to the loan denial tests, the coefficients on the uninstrumented Accrual measure are 
negative and significant.  The coefficient on Accrual in the first model suggests that the use of 
accrual accounting reduces interest rates by 37.3 basis points, which is equivalent to 6.2 percent of 
the mean interest rate in the sample.18
When the interaction between Accrual and Credit score is included as an additional predictor 
variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant and the coefficient on the 
Credit score main effect is negative and significant.  The differing signs on the Accrual and Credit 
score main effect variables relative to the interaction term imply that these two information sources 
are substitutes.  That is, firms with lower (higher) credit scores receive greater (smaller) interest rate 
benefits from accrual accounting.  For example, the interest rate benefit from accrual accounting for a 
  Credit score and Relationship on the other hand, have no 
significant effects on interest rates in the first model.  Models 2, 3, 4 include two-way multiplicative 
interactions between (1) Accrual and Credit score, (2) Accrual and Relationship, and (3) Credit score 
and Relationship, respectively, to investigate potential complementarities or substitutions between 
these alternative information sources.  We examine separate two-way interactions and do not include 
a three-way multiplicative interaction in these tests because the inclusion of higher order 
multiplicative interactions using the same variables as those used for the main and lower order 
interaction effects increases a regression model’s susceptibility to multicollinearity problems.  
                                                          
18 In economic terms, the benefit from accrual accounting for the mean (median) loan amount of $831,262 
($100,000) in the interest rate sample is $3,100.61 ($373), and the total benefit from accrual accounting for the mean 
(median) total debt of $1,938,170 ($251,500) is $7,229.37 ($938). It should be noted that the benefits and incentives to 
use accrual accounting and other more sophisticated accounting methods are not confined to debt contracting. For 
example, Cassar (2009) argues that firms’ accounting sophistication can be driven by many influences including 
contracting demands within the firm, decision-making and performance evaluation requirements, firm competition and 
price pressures, and manager’s knowledge and experience. Therefore, the choice to use accrual accounting is not solely a 
function of the benefits obtained from expected changes in a firm’s cost of debt. 
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firm with a credit score at the 25th percentile is 62 basis points (-1.004 + 0.010 × 38), 37 basis points 
at the median credit score, and only 12 basis points at a credit score at the 75th percentile. 
Similarly, in Model 4 the interaction between Credit score and Relationship is positive and 
significant while the coefficient on Relationship is negative and significant, consistent with Credit 
score and Relationship being substitute information sources.  In Model 3, the interaction term 
between Accrual and Relationship is also positive but is not statistically significant.  
Model 5 presents the model with all three interactions included.  The maximum VIF for this 
specification is 9.03, slightly below the threshold of 10 or higher denoting unacceptable 
multicollinearity (Kennedy 2003).  The main and interaction effects are generally consistent with the 
models including only one interaction at a time.19
Untabulated results are similar when Accrual_hat is used to control for endogeneity in the use 
of accrual accounting (with standard errors corrected for this variable being estimated).  The 
coefficients are significantly negative on the Accrual_hat, Credit score, and Relationship main 
effects (p < 0.10, two-tailed).  Coefficient signs on the interaction terms are consistent with those 
using Accrual.  However, the interactions between the instrumented accrual measure and credit 
  To provide evidence on the economic significance 
of the substitution effects, Panel A of Table 8 presents the estimated benefits from using accrual 
accounting based on the quartile of credit score and relationship length.  The estimated benefit of 
accrual accounting is decreasing in both credit score and relationship length.  For example, Panel A 
indicates that the benefit from accrual accounting for a firm with both a credit score and a 
relationship length at the 25th percentile is 70.3 basis points (-1.196 + 0.010 × 38 + 0.245 × 0.45), but 
only 3.2 basis points when both the credit score and relationship length are at the 75th percentile. 
                                                          
19 To examine the potential influence of selection biases on these inferences, we repeated the analyses using the 
inverse Mills ratios for firms that: 1) recently applied for debt financing; and 2) recently obtained debt financing. 
Coefficients on both inverse Mills ratios were statistically insignificant, while the coefficients and statistical significance 
of the accrual accounting, credit score, relationship length, and interaction variables were similar, suggesting that our 
interest rate results are not driven by selection biases. 
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scores and between credit scores and relationship length are marginally insignificant at conventional 
levels (p = 0.16 and 0.11, two-tailed, respectively), and the interaction between Accrual_hat and 
Relationship is not significant.  Panel B of Table 8 shows the estimated economic benefit from 
(instrumented) accrual accounting for a firm with both a credit score and a relationship length at the 
25th percentile is 61 basis points (-0.815 + 0.005 × 38 + -0.004 × 0.45), and 34 basis points at a credit 
score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.  These results again suggest that the benefits of 
accrual accounting on interest rates are lower when the entity’s credit score is higher, but no longer 
provide evidence of a tradeoff between accrual accounting and relationship length on interest rates. 
4.4. Alternative Interaction Specifications  
The preceding interest rate tests assume very specific linear relationships and multiplicative 
interactions, and only consider the interactions between two of the three information sources at a 
time.  However, the influence of these alternative information sources on interest rates may vary 
depending upon the quality of the information provided by both of the other sources, and the relations 
between the individual information sources and their interactions need not have linear multiplicative 
associations with interest rates.   
We conduct two tests to investigate more complex interactions among the three information 
sources.  First, we partition the sample into two groups at the median lending relationship length.20
                                                          
20 Partitioning our sample, rather than pooling all firms, allows the coefficients on all of the interest rate 
predictors to vary across short and long banking relationships.  In addition, partitioning minimizes the multicollinearity 
problems that typically occur when a large number of multiplicative interactions are included in a regression model. A 
disadvantage of partitioning is a potential loss in estimation efficiency.   
  
The mean (median) relationship is 2.03 years (1.83 years) in the subsample of shorter relationships, 
and 15.94 years (13.00 years) in the subsample of longer relationships.  We estimate separate 
regressions of interest rates on Accrual, Credit score, their interaction, and the control variables for 
each group.  As shown in Table 9, we again find significant, positive coefficients (p < 0.10, two-
tailed) on the accrual and credit score main effects and a significant, negative coefficient on their 
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interaction term in the subsample of firms with shorter relationship lengths.  However, Accrual is not 
significant in firms with longer lending relationships.  This evidence is consistent with claims that the 
information provided by longer banking relationships subsumes any incremental information 
provided by more sophisticated accounting information or third-party credit scores.  However, when 
lending relationships are relatively short, both accrual accounting and higher credit scores can serve 
as (substitute) mechanisms for reducing information asymmetries with lenders.21
Second, we replace the Accrual, Credit Score and Relationship variables and their associated 
interactions with a series of indicator variables that classify firms based on whether they: 1) do or do 
not use accrual accounting; 2) have a credit score above or below the sample median (63); and 3) 
have a relationship with the lending institution longer or shorter than the sample median (5.5 years). 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the number of firms in each combination of accrual accounting, credit 
score, and relationship length, as well as the results from the regression of interest rates on indicators 
for these combinations and the control variables.  The (omitted) base case in the model is the group of 
firms that does not use accrual accounting, has relatively low credit scores, and relatively short 
lending relationships.  The statistically significant negative coefficients (p < 0.01) on the seven 
indicator variables imply that the highest interest rates are found in the base case of firms in the no 
accrual, low credit score, and short relationship category, indicating that information asymmetries are 
highest in these firms. 
 
To provide evidence on the associations between interest rates and the other firm groupings, 
Panel B of Table 10 presents Wald tests of the joint statistical significance of Accrual, Credit Score, 
                                                          
21 We conduct similar analyses after partitioning by credit score (using the sample median) or by accrual use. For 
each of these specifications, we find statistically negative associations between the two remaining information sources 
and interest rates for firms with lower credit scores or the non-use of accrual accounting, and no association between 
relationship length, accrual use, or credit scores in firms with higher credit score or accrual accounting. These results are 
consistent with the main specifications which suggest that the benefits from accrual use, higher credit scores, and longer 
relationships are primarily found in firms that are weaker in the other information dimensions. 
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and Relationship for the various combinations.  Consistent with the earlier specifications, Accrual has 
an overall significant effect on interest rates (F = 3.59, p = 0.0064).  However, when we subdivide 
the sample by credit score and relationship length, we only find a significant Accrual effect in firms 
with credit scores below the sample median (F = 7.10, p = 0.0009) or relationships shorter than the 
sample median (F = 6.88, p = 0.0011).  We find no significant accrual effect in firms with higher 
credit scores or longer relationships.  Moreover, when firms are further categorized by the 
combination of credit score and relationship length, accrual accounting is only significantly 
associated with interest rates in firms having both low credit scores and short relationships (F = 
13.75, p = 0.0002), with accrual accounting estimated to reduce this group of firms’ cost of debt by 
132 basis points.  These results imply that the interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are 
limited to firms that do not have alternative means for reducing information asymmetries.  
The Wald tests for Credit Score and Relationship exhibit similar findings, with the only 
statistically significant interest rate benefits from these information sources confined to the sub-
groups of firms that do not use accrual accounting or have relatively low scores on the other 
information source.  Specifically, Credit score has a significant effect in non-accrual, short 
relationship firms (F = 12.94, p = 0.0003), and Relationship has a significant effect in non-accrual, 
low credit score firms (F = 8.94, p = 0.0036).  Overall, the evidence from the classification-based 
specifications implies that firms receive little if any interest rate benefits from improving a given 
information source if they are already relatively strong in one of the alternative information sources.22
4.5. Alternative Accounting Sophistication Measures 
 
Accrual accounting is only one indicator of accounting sophistication.  Prior small and private 
business studies indicate that factors such as the preparation of financial statements and audits can 
                                                          
22 In unreported results, we further subdivided the sample into groups based on accrual use and sample terciles 
for credit scores and length of relationship, respectively. Results are consistent with those using the classifications 
reported in the tables, with the alternative information sources only having significant effects on interest rates when the 
values for the other information sources were lowest.  
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also influence loan application outcomes (e.g., Allee and Yohn, 2009, Minnis, 2010; Kim et al., 
2007).  We therefore compute a second, more comprehensive, accounting sophistication variable to 
examine the influence of these other accounting system attributes on our results.  AccSophistication is 
the sum of indicators for three accounting practices: (1) accrual rather than cash accounting; (2) the 
preparation of financial statements (defined as a balance sheet and income statement); and (3) the use 
of audited financial statements.  These indicators represent generally-accepted accounting principles 
that have been advocated by proponents of improved small business accounting (e.g., AICPA/FASB, 
2006; IASB, 2007).  The financial statement and audit indicators are based on questions asking 
whether respondents used financial statements to answer the financial questions in the survey and, if 
so, whether the financial statements were audited by a professional accountant or accounting firm.23
Untabulated results using AccSophistication (or an instrumented AccSophistication_hat 
variable) are weaker than those using the accrual measures.  In economic terms, the benefit of 
increasing the AccSophistication (AccSophistication_hat) score by 1 practice is 20 (120) basis points 
for a firm with both a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile, and -7 (66) basis 
points with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.  When we replace 
AccSophistication with separate variables for accruals, financial statements, and audits, the financial 
statement and audit indicators add no statistically significant exploratory power (p < 0.10) in any of 
the reported specifications, while the accrual results remain similar to those reported in the tables.  
  
The resulting AccSophistication variable ranges from 0 (no use of accrual accounting, financial 
statements, or audited financial statements) to 3 (use of all three practices), with a mean (median) 
score of 0.63 (0.00).  
                                                          
23 A potential limitation with the financial statement and audit indicators is that using financial statements to 
answer the survey does not necessarily indicate whether the firm prepares financial statements, since respondents can 
prepare financial statements but rely on other information (such as tax forms, bank statements, etc.) for their survey 
responses.  If this is true for many respondents, our AccSophistication variable will not fully reflect the use of these more 
sophisticated accounting practices.   
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This evidence suggests that our findings are not driven by the choice to calculate AccSophistication 
as a linear sum of the three components of accounting sophistication.  These findings also suggest 
that our results are predominantly driven by the use of accrual accounting.24
4.6. The Moderating Role of Collateral 
 
We next partition our analysis by whether or not the firm pledged collateral for the loan.  As 
discussed earlier, economic theories argue that collateral can be used to reduce adverse selection by 
acting as a sorting mechanism since only higher quality borrowers will be willing to pledge their 
assets (i.e., reducing adverse selection problems), or lowering moral hazard problems by providing 
incentives for borrowers to provide greater effort or abstain from shifting borrowed funds from 
lower-risk to higher-risk projects.  Consistent with these theories, Bharath et al. (2009) find that the 
incentives to pledge collateral are strongest for the informational opaque, such as those with short 
lending relationships.  If borrowers can reduce interest rates by pledging collateral rather than by 
reducing information asymmetries through the provision of more sophisticated accounting 
information (or through higher credit scores or longer banking relationships), then the benefits from 
accrual accounting should be lower on loans with collateral.    
Consistent with this prediction, untabulated regression models show an accrual accounting 
benefit of -0.607 (p = 0.04, two-tailed) in firms that did not pledge collateral and -0.199 (p = 0.29) in 
those pledging collateral.  When we include multiplicative interaction terms in these models, the 
results continue to indicate that the benefits from accrual accounting are decreasing in both credit 
scores and relationship length, but that any benefits are lower or nonexistent in firms that pledge 
collateral.  For example, the benefit from accrual accounting for a firm not pledging (pledging) 
collateral and having a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile is 103 (39) basis 
points, and 21 (0) basis points at a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.  
                                                          
24 We repeated our analyses using two other dichotomous variables representing the other levels of auditor 
association (review and compilation). The results are consistently weaker using this specification. 
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The finding that collateral reduces any interest rate benefits from accrual accounting is 
reinforced when we estimate the models using categorical variables for accrual use or non-use, credit 
scores below or above the median, and relationship lengths above or below the median, thereby 
allowing for nonlinearities.  As shown in Table 11, we find no significant differences in interest rate 
across the various classifications or their interactions in the subsample of loans with collateral.  In 
contrast, accrual use has a significant, positive main effect on interest rates in loans without 
collateral, but any significant accrual accounting benefit in this subsample is again limited to 
borrowers with low credit scores and/or short relationship lengths.  This evidence supports theories 
that contractual characteristics such as collateral can substitute for higher quality information when 
addressing information asymmetries in lending decisions. 
4.7. Other Moderating Factors 
The debt literature suggests that the age of the borrower’s firm and its legal liability can also 
influence the level of information asymmetries.  We examine the influence of firm age by 
partitioning our sample into firms that are younger or older than the sample median (15 years). 
Information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are argued to be decreasing in firm age 
(Diamond 1989; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Minnis, 2010).  As information on firms becomes 
increasingly available over time, the value of greater accounting sophistication and longer lending 
relationships for reducing information asymmetries may decline as credit scores and other external 
information sources reflect a larger information set.  In untabulated tests, we find an accrual 
accounting interest rate benefit of -0.642 in younger firms (p = 0.03, two-tailed) and an insignificant -
0.180 (p = 0.35) in older firms, consistent with the benefits of accounting sophistication being greater 
for younger firms.  We also find a significantly negative association between credit scores and 
interest rates in older firms (β = -0.006, p = 0.04) but not in younger firms, consistent with credit 
scores becoming more informative as they incorporate more firm history. 
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Inclusion of the interaction terms reveals that the interest rate benefits from accrual 
accounting are decreasing in credit scores and relationship length, but only in younger firms.  For 
example, the estimated benefit from accrual accounting in a firm younger than the sample median 
and with a credit score and relationship length at the 25th percentile is 129 basis points relative to a 
younger firm with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.  However, there are no 
significant interaction effects in older firms, suggesting that the interest rate benefits from accrual 
accounting are primarily in younger firms with relatively low credit scores and short lending 
relationships. 
Second, we partition our sample by the firm’s legal liability.  Avery et al. (1998) argue that 
reducing information asymmetries is more important for lenders to limited liability firms since the 
borrowers’ personal wealth is protected in the case of default.  Consistent with this hypothesis, Allee 
and Yohn (2009) find that the use of accrual-based financial statements is associated with lower 
interest rates in small businesses with limited liability, but find no interest rate benefit in businesses 
with unlimited liability.  Similarly, when we estimate interest rate models without the interaction 
terms, we find no significant benefit from accrual accounting (p = 0.33, two-tailed) in unlimited 
liability firms but a significant -0.379 rate reduction (p = 0.04) in limited liability firms (not reported 
in the tables).  However, when we include the interaction terms, accrual accounting and its 
interactions become significant in both subsamples.  In both limited and unlimited liability firms, the 
interest rate benefits from accrual accounting are again decreasing in both credit scores and 
relationship length.  For example, the benefit from accrual accounting in an unlimited (limited) 
liability firm with a credit score and a relationship length at the 25th percentile differs by 128 (64) 
basis points from a firm with a credit score and relationship length at the 75th percentile.  Thus, once 
the alternative information sources are incorporated into the analyses, accrual accounting exhibits 
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potential interest rate benefits regardless of the borrowers’ legal liability, with greater benefits in 
unlimited liability firms. 
Our analyses of the influence of firm age and legal liability continue to support the finding 
that the use of accrual accounting can provide interest rate benefits, but that any benefits from this 
more sophisticated accounting method is decreasing in the firm’s credit score and relationship length.  
However, the results also suggest that firm age and legal liability moderate the relation between the 
various information sources (and their interactions) and interest rates. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines whether accrual accounting, third-party credit scores, and the “soft” 
information provided by relationship banking interact to reduce information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, thereby increasing the firm’s access to debt and lowering the firm’s interest 
rate.  We investigate this question using a large, representative sample of small, privately-held firms.  
The small firm setting has the advantage of having fewer competing information sources and no 
mandatory accounting practices that may affect observed associations between accounting 
sophistication and lending decisions.  In contrast to prior small business lending studies, we provide 
evidence on whether alternative “hard” and “soft” information sources (accrual accounting, third-
party credit scores, and relationship banking) are substitute means for reducing information 
asymmetries.  In doing so, our study informs regulators and practitioners, as well as extending prior 
studies on the relative informativeness of accounting sophistication to the capital markets.  
We find little evidence that accrual accounting reduces the likelihood of loan denial; however, 
higher credit scores are negatively associated with loan denial, suggesting that the information 
contained in these scores is used in the initial decision to accept or deny the application, while the 
incremental information from accrual accounting has little influence on this decision.  In contrast, we 
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find accrual accounting is negatively associated with the initial interest rate on approved loans, 
consistent with firm provided accounting reducing information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers.  
Examining the complementary or substitutability between accounting sophistication (in our 
case accrual accounting), soft information, and third party credit scores on the borrower’s cost of debt 
suggests that these alternative information sources are substitute means for assessing borrower risk 
and determining interest rates.  We show that any interest rate benefits from accrual accounting in 
small firms is contingent on (diminishing in) the length of their existing banking relationships and 
publicly available creditworthiness.  Further analyses suggest that accrual accounting only has a 
significant influence on interest rates in firms that have weak credit scores and short relationships 
with their lender, and vice versa.  Moreover, any interest rate benefits from the alternative 
information sources appear to be eliminated when the borrower pledges collateral, supporting 
economic theories that collateral provides an alternative mechanism to deal with information 
asymmetries in lending decisions.  Further examination of contingency factors suggests that firm age 
and legal liability further moderate the influence of the various information sources (and their 
interactions) on interest rates.  Taken together, our findings suggest that although improvements in 
financial accounting sophistication in this setting can be beneficial, it is likely to benefit only a subset 
of small business borrowers and lenders.  Overall, our study demonstrates the importance of 
evaluating the role of accounting information in the context of the firm’s overall information 
environment, and of considering the role of debt contract characteristics when assessing the potential 
benefits from more sophisticated accounting information in lending decisions. 
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
 
   
Firms 
    
    Survey of Small Business Finances sample  4,240  
        Minus    
            Firms with non-positive assets, sales, shareholders  508  
            Publicly traded firms  5  
            Corporations (other than S) with annual receipts above $5 million  351  
            Respondents with missing accounting choice  83  
    Firms available for analysis   3,293  
    
    Firms that recently applied for debt financing  1,402  
        Minus    
            Respondents with missing responses to any independent variable   17  
    Sample used in loan denial analysis  1,385  
    
    Firms with recent debt financing  1,309  
        Minus    
            Respondents with missing interest rate  88  
            Respondents with missing responses to any independent variable   30  
    Sample used in interest rate analysis  1,191  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and variable definitions 
 
       
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, full sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std. dev. First quartile Median Third quartile 
Accrual 3,293 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Credit score 3,271 58.97 29.55 38.00 63.00 88.00 
Log total assets 3,290 5.17 1.02 4.49 5.16 5.89 
Owner manager 3,272 0.92 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Log number of owners 3,293 0.22 0.29 0.00 0.30 0.30 
Family owned 3,290 0.85 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Corporation 3,293 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Cash to assets 3,211 0.24 0.29 0.03 0.12 0.36 
Firm age 3,265 15.90 11.84 7.00 14.00 23.00 
Sales growth (1 year) 3,274 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Sales growth (3 years) 3,247 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Trade credit 3,293 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Accounts receivable 3,293 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Apply 3,293 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
       
Panel B: Descriptive statistics, denial sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std. dev. First quartile Median Third quartile 
Denied 1,385 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Accrual 1,385 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Credit score 1,385 59.20 29.78 38.00 63.00 88.00 
Log total assets 1,385 5.64 0.90 5.03 5.67 6.27 
Return on assets 1,385 0.66 1.83 0.01 0.15 0.57 
Asset turnover 1,385 4.86 7.08 1.42 2.84 5.00 
Debt to assets 1,385 0.87 1.08 0.28 0.60 0.97 
Firm age 1,385 16.86 12.35 8.00 15.00 23.00 
Bankrupt 1,385 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Judgment 1,385 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Personal delinquency 1,385 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm delinquency 1,385 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics, interest rate sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std. dev. First quartile Median Third quartile 
Interest rate 1,191 5.97 2.81 4.50 5.90 7.00 
Accrual 1,191 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Credit score 1,191 60.70 29.34 38.00 63.00 88.00 
Relationship 1,191 0.78 0.46 0.45 0.81 1.14 
Prime rate 1,191 4.39 0.74 4.00 4.22 4.58 
Duration spread 1,191 2.41 0.42 2.11 2.28 2.68 
Term premium 1,191 0.60 0.95 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Debt to assets 1,191 0.82 0.99 0.28 0.59 0.95 
Fixed rate 1,191 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Log total assets 1,191 5.69 0.89 5.08 5.70 6.32 
Log amount 1,191 5.09 0.80 4.48 5.00 5.60 
Collateral 1,191 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Primary institution 1,191 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Panel D: Variable definitions 
  
Variables Description 
  
Accounts receivable An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm records sales on account, zero otherwise 
Accrual  An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm uses accrual accounting, zero otherwise  
Apply An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm applied for a loan in the previous three 
years, zero otherwise 
Asset turnover a Sales divided by total assets 
Bankrupt An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm or owner declared bankruptcy in the past 
seven years, zero otherwise 
Cash to assets a Total cash divided by total assets 
Collateral An indicator variable taking the value of one if collateral is provided for the loan, zero otherwise 
Corporation  An indicator variable taking the value of one if the entity was a corporation, zero otherwise 
Credit score Dun & Bradstreet credit score 
Debt to assets a Total debt divided by total assets 
Denied An indicator variable taking the value of one if firm was denied credit at least one in the last three 
years, zero otherwise 
Duration spread Difference between Baa bond and yield on 10-year treasury bonds at the time of the loan 
Family owned An indicator variable taking the value of one if more than 50 percent of equity is owned by a single 
family, zero otherwise 
Firm age Age of the firm in years 
Firm delinquency An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm was delinquent on obligations one or more 
times in the past three years, zero otherwise 
Fixed rate An indicator variable taking the value of one if the interest rate on the loan is fixed (rather than 
variable), zero otherwise 
Interest rate Interest rate on most recent loan 
Judgment An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm or owner has any judgments against it in 
the past three years, zero otherwise 
Log amount Log 10 of the loan amount 
Log number of owners Log 10 of the number of owners/partners/shareholders 
Log total assets Log 10 of the firm’s total assets 
Owner manager An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is managed by an owner, zero otherwise 
Personal delinquency An indicator variable taking the value of one if the owner was delinquent on personal obligations 
one or more times in the past three years, zero otherwise 
Primary institution An indicator variable taking the value of one if the debt is obtained from the firm’s primary 
financial institution, zero otherwise 
Prime rate  The prime rate at the start of the loan 
Relationship Log 10 the number of years the firm had conducted business with the lending institution at the time 
of the most recently approved loan application 
Return on assets a Profit divided by total assets 
Sales growth (1 year) An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s total sales were greater than the previous 
year, zero otherwise 
Sales growth (3 years) An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm’s total sales were greater than three years 
earlier, zero otherwise 
Trade credit An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm records purchases on account, zero 
otherwise 
Term premium Difference between yield on government bond with similar maturity and yield on treasury bill 
 
a Ratios winsorized at 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent. 
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Table 3 
Correlations 
 
 
Panel A: Loan denial sample 
            
Variable Denied Accrual Credit score Log total 
assets 
Asset 
turnover 
Return on 
assets 
Debt-to-
assets 
Firm age Bankrupt Judgment Personal 
delinquency 
Denied                       
Accrual -0.10 **           
Credit score -0.10 ** 0.06 *          
Log total assets -0.24 ** 0.45 ** 0.12 **         
Asset turnover -0.16 ** -0.12 ** 0.04 -0.45 **        
Return on assets 0.00 -0.15 ** -0.02 -0.31 ** 0.54 **       
Debt to assets -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 ** -0.31 ** 0.41 ** 0.17 **      
Firm age 0.12 ** 0.07 ** 0.16 ** -0.24 ** -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 **     
Bankrupt -0.13 ** -0.07 ** -0.12 ** -0.09 ** -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01    
Judgment 0.11 ** -0.04 -0.11 ** -0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.09 ** -0.02 0.09 **   
Personal delinquency 0.14 ** -0.11 ** -0.20 ** -0.16 ** -0.01 -0.02 0.07 ** -0.10 ** 0.10 ** 0.28 **  
Firm delinquency 0.27 ** 0.08 ** -0.33 ** 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.13 ** -0.03 0.05 0.19 ** 0.30 ** 
                       
Variables are defined in Table 2. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; n = 1,385 
 
             
Panel B: Cost of debt sample 
             
Variable Interest 
rate 
Accrual Credit score Relationship  Prime  
rate 
Duration 
spread 
Term 
premium 
Debt-to-
assets 
Fixed rate Log total 
assets 
Log  
amount 
Collateral 
Interest rate             
Accrual -0.20 **            
Credit score -0.09 ** 0.06 *           
Relationship -0.08 ** 0.03 0.11 **          
Prime rate 0.06 * -0.01 0.00 -0.02         
Duration spread 0.07 * -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 ** 0.21 **        
Term premium 0.15 ** -0.09 ** -0.04 -0.13 ** -0.05 0.09 **       
Debt to assets 0.10 ** -0.03 -0.08 ** -0.10 ** -0.04 0.01 -0.02      
Fixed rate 0.27 ** -0.10 ** -0.04 -0.08 ** 0.12 ** 0.13 ** 0.65 ** -0.03     
Log total assets -0.31 ** 0.44 ** 0.10 ** 0.14 ** -0.04 -0.12 ** -0.14 ** -0.29 ** -0.26 **    
Log amount -0.33 ** 0.36 ** 0.12 ** 0.06 * -0.06 -0.09 ** -0.18 ** -0.05 -0.39 ** 0.74 **   
Collateral -0.12 ** 0.12 ** -0.01 -0.07 * 0.02 0.07 * 0.10 ** 0.02 -0.04 0.20 ** 0.30 **  
Primary institution -0.07 0.14 ** 0.04 0.34 ** -0.04 -0.05 -0.19 ** -0.01 -0.18 ** 0.13 ** 0.18 ** 0.03 
             
Variables are defined in Table 2. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; n = 1,191 
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Table 4 
Determinants of the use of accrual accounting 
 
  
Instruments Only 
 
All Exogenous Variables 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
   
Days in inventory 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.001 
Accounts receivable 1.041 *** 0.051 0.629 *** 0.059 
     
Log of total assets   0.671 *** 0.035 
Return on assets   -0.007 0.014 
Asset turnover   0.015 *** 0.004 
Debt to assets   0.140 *** 0.025 
Firm age   -0.003 0.002 
Bankrupt   0.096 0.185 
Judgment   -0.188 * 0.133 
Personal delinquency   -0.188 * 0.100 
Firm delinquency   0.146 * 0.076 
Credit score   0.000 0.001 
Intercept -1.108 *** 0.046 -4.532 *** 0.198 
   
N 3,292 3,197 
Log likelihood -1913.13 -1603.85 
Pseudo R2 .113 .234 
χ2 487.09*** 978.34*** 
 
Accrual = α + β1Days in inventory + β2Accounts receivable + β3Log of total assets + 
β4Return on assets + β5Asset turnover + β6Debt to assets + β7Firm age + β8Bankrupt + 
β9Judgment + β10Personal delinquency + β11Firm delinquency + β12Judgment + 
β13Personal delinquency + β14Firm delinquency + β15Credit score 
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity uses 
accrual accounting, and zero otherwise. Variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * 
denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of applying for a loan 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
  
Log total assets 0.484 *** 0.033 
Owner manager 0.202 ** 0.089 
Log number of owners 0.271 *** 0.099 
Cash to assets -0.745 *** 0.103 
Return on assets 0.006 0.012 
Firm age -0.001 0.002 
Sales growth (1 year) 0.153 *** 0.056 
Sales growth (3 years) 0.043 0.056 
Intercept -2.861 *** 0.203 
  
N 3,090 
Log likelihood -1,792.64 
Pseudo R2 0.149 
χ2 632.02 
  
Apply = α + β1Log total assets + β2Owner manager + β3Log number of owners + 
β4Cash to assets + β5Return on assets + β6Firm age + β7Sales growth (1 year)+ β8Sales 
growth (3 years) 
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity has 
applied for a loan in the last three years, and zero otherwise. Independent variables are 
defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-
tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of loan denial 
 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
    
Accrual -0.147 0.116 -0.067 0.201     
Credit score -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.009 *** 0.002 -0.009 *** 0.002 -0.011 *** 0.002 
Accrual × Credit score   -0.002 0.004     
Accrual_hat     -0.608 0.444 -0.041 0.214 
Accrual_hat × Credit score       -0.004 0.003 
         
Log of total assets -0.689 *** 0.167 -0.685 *** 0.167 -0.553 *** 0.210 -0.584 *** 0.198 
Return on assets -0.029 0.033 -0.029 0.033 -0.034 0.033 -0.026 0.033 
Asset turnover -0.005 0.009 -0.005 0.009 -0.001 0.009 -0.003 0.009 
Debt to assets 0.100 ** 0.046 0.101 ** 0.046 0.117 ** 0.047 0.126 ** 0.052 
Firm age -0.011 ** 0.005 -0.011 ** 0.005 -0.011 ** 0.005 -0.011 ** 0.005 
Bankrupt 0.456 0.319 0.464 0.319 0.423 0.319 0.496 0.319 
Judgment 0.138 0.213 0.136 0.212 0.081 0.218 0.127 0.215 
Personal delinquency 0.651 *** 0.157 0.651 *** 0.156 0.612 *** 0.164 0.641 *** 0.159 
Firm delinquency 0.152 0.130 0.146 0.131 0.202 0.134 0.154 0.136 
Inverse mills ratio -1.373 *** 0.422 -1.367 *** 0.422 -1.370 *** 0.416 -1.435 *** 0.426 
Intercept 4.195 *** 1.207 4.141 *** 1.211 3.906 *** 1.310 3.559 *** 1.350 
     
N 1,308 1,308 1,307 1,307 
Log likelihood -370.40 -370.28 -369.05 -368.35 
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.184 0.182 0.184 
χ2 166.19 166.42 164.03 165.88 
 
Denial = α + β1Accrual + β2Credit score + β3Accrual×Credit score + β4Accrual_hat + β5Accrual_hat×Credit score + β6Log of total assets + 
β7Return on assets + β8Asset turnover + β9Debt to assets + β10Firm age + β11Bankrupt + β12Judgment + β13Personal delinquency + β14Firm 
delinquency + β15Inverse mills ratio 
Table reports probit estimation. Dependent variable is coded one if the entity was denied credit on a loan application in the last three years, and 
zero otherwise. Accrual_hat is an instrumental variable of voluntary accrual use is based on probit model from Table 4. Inverse mills ratio is 
based on probit model for applying for a loan from Table 5. All remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7 
Determinants of interest rates with interactions 
 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
Independent variables Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
      
Accrual -0.373 ** 0.168 -1.004 *** 0.352 -0.664 ** 0.305 -0.392 ** 0.169 -1.196 *** 0.416 
Credit score -0.003 0.003 -0.008 ** 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.015 *** 0.006 
Relationship -0.265 0.176 -0.290 * 0.176 -0.449 * 0.239 -0.864 ** 0.381 -0.995 ** 0.401 
Accrual × Credit score   0.010 ** 0.005     0.010 ** 0.005 
Accrual × Relationship     0.372 0.326   0.245 0.329 
Credit score × Relationship       0.010 * 0.005 0.009 * 0.005 
           
Prime rate 0.129 0.105 0.133 0.105 0.124 0.105 0.129 0.105 0.130 0.105 
Duration spread 0.054 0.187 0.060 0.186 0.067 0.187 0.058 0.186 0.072 0.187 
Term premium 0.025 0.117 0.014 0.117 0.002 0.117 0.019 0.117 0.005 0.117 
Debt to assets 0.151 * 0.082 0.152 * 0.082 0.149 * 0.082 0.152 * 0.082 0.152 * 0.082 
Fixed rate 1.205 *** 0.217 1.222 *** 0.217 1.204 *** 0.217 1.205 *** 0.216 1.225 *** 0.216 
Log total assets -0.150 0.143 -0.152 0.143 -0.152 0.143 -0.147 0.143 -0.151 0.143 
Log amount -0.765 *** 0.162 -0.758 *** 0.162 -0.762 *** 0.162 -0.769 *** 0.162 -0.762 *** 0.162 
Collateral -0.274 * 0.163 -0.271 * 0.163 -0.278 * 0.163 -0.267 0.163 -0.267 0.163 
Primary institution 0.119 0.185 0.125 0.185 0.136 0.186 0.119 0.185 0.136 0.185 
Intercept 10.089 *** 0.903 10.345 *** 0.910 10.230 *** 0.911 10.538 *** 0.937 10.868 *** 0.948 
Loan type indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 
R2 0.185 0.188 0.186 0.187 0.191 
F-stat 15.653 15.054 14.860 14.985 13.761 
F-stat for interactions     2.661 
      
Interest rate = α + β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Relationship + β4Accrual×Credit score + β5Accrual×Relationship + β6Credit score×Relationship + β7 Prime rate + 
β8Duration spread + β9Term premium + β10Debt to assets + β11Fixed rate + β12Log total assets + β13Log amount + β14Collateral + β15Primary institution 
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. All variables are 
defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effect of accrual accounting on interest rates by credit score and relationship length 
 
Panel A: Estimation based on accrual accounting (Accrual) from Table 7, Model 5 
    
Credit Score 
 Percentile  25th 50th 75th 
  Value 38 63 88 
Relationship 
25th 0.45 -0.703 -0.452 -0.201 
50th 0.81 -0.615 -0.364 -0.112 
75th 1.14 -0.534 -0.283 -0.032 
      
 
Panel B: Estimation based on instrumented accrual accounting (Accrual_hat) use 
    
Credit Score 
 Percentile  25th 50th 75th 
  Value 38 63 88 
Relationship 
25th 0.45 -0.609 -0.472 -0.335 
50th 0.81 -0.610 -0.473 -0.336 
75th 1.14 -0.611 -0.474 -0.337 
      
 
Provides estimate of the effect of accrual accounting (β1 + β4 + β5) on the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan for 
a given Credit score and Relationship based on the following OLS estimation model (Table 7, Model 5): Interest rate = α 
+ β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Relationship + β4Accrual×Credit score + β5Accrual×Relationship + β6Credit 
score×Relationship + β7 Prime rate + β8Duration spread + β9Term premium + β10Debt to assets + β11Fixed rate + β12Log 
total assets + β13Log amount + β14Collateral + β15Primary institution 
Regression includes loan type fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 2. The values provided with the percentiles 
are based on sample percentiles of Relationship and Credit score for the cost of debt sample. 
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Table 9 
Determinants of interest rates partitioned by relationship length 
 
  
Short Relationship 
 
Long Relationship 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
   
Accrual -1.647 *** 0.537 -0.222 0.446 
Credit score -0.017 *** 0.006 0.003 0.004 
Accrual × Credit score 0.019 ** 0.008 -0.000 5 0.006 
     
Relationship -0.033 0.072 -0.015 * 0.009 
Prime rate 0.068 0.167 0.162 0.126 
Duration spread 0.102 0.296 0.052 0.225 
Term premium -0.175 0.181 0.203 0.144 
Debt to assets 0.103 0.126 0.166 0.103 
Fixed rate 1.703 *** 0.348 0.772 *** 0.257 
Log total assets -0.174 0.230 -0.138 0.170 
Log amount -0.674 *** 0.260 -0.840 *** 0.193 
Collateral -0.475 * 0.268 -0.011 0.189 
Primary institution -0.132 0.269 0.522 ** 0.251 
Intercept 10.840 *** 1.437 9.534 *** 1.101 
Loan type indicators Yes  Yes  
     
n 598 591 
R2 0.209 0.203 
F-stat 8.52*** 8.11*** 
 
Interest rate = α + β1Accrual + β2 Credit score + β3Accrual×Credit score + 
β4Relationship + β5 Prime rate + β6Duration spread + β7Term premium + β8Debt to 
assets + β9Fixed rate + β10Log total assets + β11Log amount + β12Collateral + 
β13Primary institution 
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent 
variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. Entities are partitioned by 
whether the years with their financiers is greater or less than the sample median 
respectively. All remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * 
denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 10 
Determinants of interest rates using indicator variables  
 
 
Independent variables 
 
N 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
  
1. Accrual Y × Credit Score H × Relationship L 230 -1.175 *** 0.315 
2. Accrual Y × Credit Score L × Relationship L 73 -1.334 *** 0.396 
3. Accrual Y × Credit Score H × Relationship S 196 -1.171 *** 0.316 
4. Accrual Y × Credit Score L × Relationship S 98 -1.326 *** 0.358 
5. Accrual N × Credit Score H × Relationship L 184 -0.995 *** 0.308 
6. Accrual N × Credit Score L × Relationship L 104 -1.016 *** 0.349 
7. Accrual N × Credit Score H × Relationship S 187 -1.088 *** 0.302 
8. Accrual N × Credit Score L × Relationship S 119 -- -- 
            
 Prime rate 0.126 0.105 
 Duration spread 0.072 0.186 
 Term premium 0.018 0.117 
 Debt to assets 0.138 0.082 
 Fixed rate 0.218 0.216 
 Log total assets -0.161 0.143 
 Log amount -0.745 0.161 
 Collateral -0.249 0.163 
 Primary institution 0.077 0.181 
 Intercept 10.523 0.908 
 Loan type indicators Yes  
   
n 1,189 
R2 0.194 
F-stat 13.34 
  
  
Partitioned Wald Tests of Joint Significance         
        
Tests of Accrual Effect (from N = 0 to Y = 1) for: a   Estimate  F-stat  p-value 
    All firms       3.59   0.0064 
             
    Credit Score H      0.26 0.769 
    Credit Score L      7.10   0.0009 
    Relationship L      0.52 0.592 
    Relationship S      6.88   0.0011 
             
    Credit Score H × Relationship L  -0.180 0.47 0.495 
    Credit Score L × Relationship L  -0.319 0.67 0.423 
    Credit Score H × Relationship S  -0.082 0.09 0.762 
    Credit Score L × Relationship S  -1.326 13.75   0.0002 
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Tests of Credit Score Effect (from L to H) for: b   Estimate F-stat p-value 
    All firms       3.37   0.0095 
             
    Accrual Y      0.23 0.797 
    Accrual N      6.47   0.0016 
    Relationship L      0.11 0.897 
    Relationship S      6.61   0.0014 
             
    Accrual Y × Relationship L  0.159 0.21 0.644 
    Accrual Y × Relationship S  0.155 0.24 0.623 
    Accrual N × Relationship L  0.021 0.00 0.947 
    Accrual N × Relationship S  -1.089 12.94   0.0003 
      
Tests of Relationship Effect (from S to L) for: c   Estimate F-stat p-value 
    All firms       2.17 0.070 
             
    Accrual Y      0.00 0.999 
    Accrual N      4.34   0.0132 
    Credit Score H      0.06 0.943 
    Credit Score L      4.25   0.0145 
             
    Accrual Y × Credit Score H  -0.004 0.00 0.987 
    Accrual Y × Credit Score L  -0.008 0.00 0.984 
    Accrual N × Credit Score H  0.094 0.12 0.734 
    Accrual N × Credit Score L  -1.016 8.49   0.0036 
  
Interest rate = α + β1to7Accrual(Y/N)×Credit score(H/L)×Relationship(L/S) + β8 Prime rate + β9Duration spread + β10Term 
premium + β11Debt to assets + β12Fixed rate + β13Log total assets + β14Log amount + β15Collateral + β16Primary institution 
Omitted interaction Accrual_N×Credit score_L×Relationship_S 
Table reports OLS estimation. Regression includes loan type fixed effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the 
entity’s most recent loan. Accrual Y (N) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm uses (do not use) accrual accounting, 
zero otherwise. Credit Score H (L) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a credit score equal or above (below) the 
sample median, zero otherwise. Relationship L (S) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has a relationship length with 
their loan provider longer (equal or less) than the sample median, zero otherwise. All remaining independent variables are 
defined in Table 2.  
a Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that use accrual accounting (Accrual_Y) versus 
firms who do not (Accrual_N) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions. 
b Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that have credit scores equal or above the sample 
median (Credit score_H) versus firms who do not (Credit score_L) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions. 
c Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that have relationships with their financiers longer  
than the sample median (Relationship_L) versus firms who do not (Relationship_S) based on the model above for the listed 
sample partitions. 
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Table 11 
Determinants of interest rates using indicator variables partitioned by collateral 
 
  
Collateral = 0 
 
Collateral = 1 
 
Independent variables 
 
N 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
 
N 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. error 
     
1. Accrual Y × Credit Score H × Relationship L 101 -1.872 *** 0.529 129 -0.311 0.358 
2. Accrual Y × Credit Score L × Relationship L 29 -1.874 *** 0.707 44 -0.595 0.432 
3. Accrual Y × Credit Score H × Relationship S 75 -1.825 *** 0.534 121 -0.474 0.357 
4. Accrual Y × Credit Score L × Relationship S 40 -2.061 *** 0.626 58 -0.431 0.393 
5. Accrual N × Credit Score H × Relationship L 110 -1.449 *** 0.487 74 -0.341 0.373 
6. Accrual N × Credit Score L × Relationship L 53 -1.726 *** 0.567 51 -0.120 0.406 
7. Accrual N × Credit Score H × Relationship S 83 -1.696 *** 0.507 104 -0.309 0.346 
8. Accrual N × Credit Score L × Relationship S 66 -- -- 53 -- -- 
               
 Prime rate -0.127 0.186  0.355 *** 0.112 
 Duration spread 0.220 0.337  -0.029 0.199 
 Term premium -0.325 0.230  0.301 0.121 
 Debt to assets 0.769 0.134  0.212 0.096 
 Fixed rate 1.534 *** 0.349  0.732 *** 0.255 
 Log total assets -0.352 0.232  0.039 0.169 
 Log amount -0.855 *** 0.277  -0.661 *** 0.184 
 Primary institution -0.189 0.314  0.323 0.199 
 Intercept 13.623 *** 1.649  6.939 *** 1.003 
 Loan type indicators Yes   Yes  
       
n 556   633   
R2 0.213   0.175   
F-stat 7.25   7.70   
     
       
Partitioned Wald Tests of Joint Significance              
             
Tests of Accrual Effect (from N = 0 to Y = 1) for: a   Estimate F-stat p-value Estimate F-stat p-value 
    All firms       2.84 0.024   0.66  0.621 
                  
    Credit Score H      0.50 0.608   0.17  0.842 
    Credit Score L      5.41   0.0047   1.19  0.306 
    Relationship L      0.49 0.613   0.63  0.531 
    Relationship S      5.42   0.0047   0.72  0.487 
                  
    Credit Score H × Relationship L  -0.423 0.95 0.329   0.01  0.923 
    Credit Score L × Relationship L  -0.148 0.04 0.836   1.24  0.266 
    Credit Score H × Relationship S  -0.129 0.07 0.795   0.32  0.573 
    Credit Score L × Relationship S  -2.061 10.82   0.0011   1.20  0.273 
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Interest rate = α + β1to7Accrual(Y/N)×Credit score(H/L)×Relationship(L/S) + β8 Prime rate + β9Duration spread + β10Term 
premium + β11Debt to assets + β12Fixed rate + β13Log total assets + β14Log amount + β15Primary institution 
Omitted interaction Accrual_N×Credit score_L×Relationship_S 
Table reports OLS estimation partitioned by whether collateral is provided for the loan. Regression includes loan type fixed 
effects. Dependent variable is the interest rate on the entity’s most recent loan. Accrual Y (N) is an indicator variable coded one if 
the firm uses (do not use) accrual accounting, zero otherwise. Credit Score H (L) is an indicator variable coded one if the firm has 
a credit score equal or above (below) the sample median, zero otherwise. Relationship L (S) is an indicator variable coded one if 
the firm has a relationship length with their loan provider longer (equal or less) than the sample median, zero otherwise. All 
remaining independent variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
a Estimates the interest rate effect (coefficient, F-stat, and p-value) for firms that use accrual accounting (Accrual_Y) versus firms 
who do not (Accrual_N) based on the model above for the listed sample partitions. 
 
